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I. INTRODUCTION
URING this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court reinforced
its policy of easing the procedural complexity of appeals while at
the same time continuing its effort to reduce the increasing num-
bers of mandamus actions.
In Jamar v. Patterson' the court decided that the failure to pay the ac-
companying filing fee would not prevent the appellant from relying on
the extension of the appellate deadline achieved by filing a motion for
1. 868 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1993)(per curiam).
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new trial because the motion is considered conditionally filed when ten-
dered.2 In Fredonia State Bank v. General Am. Life Ins. Co.3 the court
held that an appellant need not file a "redundant" second motion for new
trial after the entry of a modified judgment on any point raised in the first
motion for new trial that continues to apply to the second judgment, even
though the first motion was overruled by operation of law before entry of
the modified judgment. 4 Also, in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ninth
Court of Appeals5 the court eased compliance with the rules governing
filing of electronic recordings of statements of fact by deciding that any
reasonable explanation provided in a timely filed motion for extension of
time suffices to excuse a late filing so long as the failure is not deliberate,
even if characterized as professional negligence. 6
On the other hand, the court made clear in Canadian Helicopters Ltd.
v. Wittig7 that it (maybe) meant what it said in Walker v. Packers about
denying requests for writ of mandamus when an adequate remedy exists
by appeal.9 The court in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. resolved a conflict
among the courts of appeals by deciding that an order overruling a spe-
cial appearance is not generally reviewable by mandamus. 10 The court
has since carved out two limited exceptions." The third exception that
the dissent in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. called the "really clear" abuse of
discretion review of special appearance orders remains ambiguous,
however.12
Other significant developments during the Survey period occurred in
the supreme court's pronouncements on standards of review. In Ruiz v.
Conoco, Inc.'3 the court, recognizing that the governing statute was fun-
damentally flawed, 14 decided that the appellate court must review a
venue decision of the trial court by reviewing the entire record, including
trial on the merits, despite the fact' that the trial court makes the decision
based on a more limited record.' 5 While in Ellis County State Bank v.
Keever' 6 the court determined that an appellate court does not need to
2. Id. at 319.
3. 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994).
4. Id. at 281.
5. 864 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. 1993).
6. Id. at 60.
7. 876 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1994).
8. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992).
9. In National Union, the dissenting justices observed that, rather than following
Walker, the court stood Walker's main principle on its head by allowing mandamus review
when the relator could have raised the issue by writ of error after appeal to the court of
appeals. 864 S.W.2d at 63.
10. 876 S.W.2d at 306.
11. See Geary v. Peavy, 878 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam);
K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. 1994).
12. 876 S.W.2d at 310.
13. 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993).
14. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986).
15. Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 757-58.
16. 888 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1994).
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follow the requirements of Pool v. Ford Motor Co. 17 by detailing the evi-
dence when the court affirms rather than reverses a decision of the trial
court, the court in Transportation Ins. Co. v. Morieli8 required courts of
appeals to follow Pool in opinions affirming awards of punitive
damages.19
II. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS
1. Order Overruling Special Appearance
In three cases during the review period, the Texas Supreme Court clari-
fied the availability of mandamus review of interlocutory decisions con-
cerning personal jurisdiction. Resolving a conflict between the courts of
appeals,20 the supreme court held in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig
that mandamus would not issue to overturn a trial court's order overrul-
ing a special appearance. 21 The court emphasized that an adequate rem-
edy by appeal exists unless a party is in danger of "permanently losing
substantial rights."22 A party does not demonstrate an inadequate rem-
edy by appeal through a "mere showing that appeal would involve more
expense or delay than obtaining a writ of mandamus. '23 Rejecting the
relator's arguments regarding inconvenience, loss of time and other "non-
pecuniary" reasons it would suffer by having to go through an entire trial,
the supreme court held "such factors alone can never justify mandamus
relief."'24 The court also rejected the relator's argument that the due pro-
cess rights implicated by a special appearance render appeal an inade-
quate remedy.25 The court characterized the due process right at issue as
"not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which [the
17. 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
18. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
19. Id. at 31.
20. Compare Laykin v. McFall, 830 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, orig. pro-
ceeding) with N.H. Helicopters, Inc. v. Brown, 841 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
orig. proceeding).
21. 876 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Tex. 1994).
22. Id. at 306. The underlying cause of action in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. concerned
a fatal helicopter crash in British Columbia. The helicopter was owned by the relator,
Canadian Helicopters Ltd. (CHL). The plaintiffs filed a wrongful death suit against CHL
and defendant Bell Helicopter Textron in Texas state court. CHL entered a special ap-
pearance pursuant to TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a, contesting the personal jurisdiction of the trial
court. CHL argued that it lacked minimum contacts with Texas. The trial judge appointed
a special master to consider CHL's jurisdictional objection. The master filed a report con-
cluding that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction and recommended that CHL's spe-
cial appearance be sustained. Subsequently, the trial court overruled CHL's special
appearance in an order making no reference to the master's report. CHL filed a motion
for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals in Houston in the
Fourteenth District. The court of appeals overruled the motion. CHL subsequently filed a
motion for leave to file a petition of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court. The court
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defendant] has established no meaningful 'contacts,'" not the right to
avoid trial in the first instance. 26
The court suggested exceptions to its holding. Distinguishing its deci-
sion in United Mexican States v. Ashley,27 it observed that mandamus re-
view of a special appearance is appropriate in cases involving the issue of
sovereign immunity, implicating comity and foreign affairs concerns not
present in the usual special appearance. 28 It also indicated that manda-
mus may be appropriate when denial of a special appearance implicates
the rights of parents and children in family law situations.29 Finally, it
observed that a trial court, in denying a special appearance, "may act with
such disregard for guiding principles of law that the harm to the defend-
ant becomes irreparable, exceeding mere increased cost and delay, ...
and.., remedy by appeal may be inadequate and mandamus therefore
appropriate. "30
While the third "exception" remains somewhat fuzzy,31 two months af-
ter its decision in Canadian Helicopters Ltd., the Texas Supreme Court in
KD.F. v. Rex32 clarified the "comity exception" to the rule prohibiting
mandamus review of a special appearance. Later, in Geary v. Peavy, the
supreme court formally recognized the second Canadian Helicopters Ltd.
exception in family law cases involving special appearances.
33
In KD.F. the plaintiff brought suit against an instrumentality of the
Kansas government, the Kansas Public Employees' Retirement System
(KPERS), in a Texas trial court. 34 Under a Kansas mandatory venue stat-
ute, however, all actions brought against KPERS must be filed in Shaw-
nee County, Kansas.35 The Texas trial court overruled KPERS' special
appearance objection to jurisdiction, and KPERS sought mandamus re-
lief.36 Conditionally granting writ, the Supreme Court expressly adopted
the comity exception enunciated in Canadian Helicopters Ltd., noting the
risk of "harm to interstate and international relations likely to occur if a
Texas trial court erroneously exercises jurisdiction over another sover-
26. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
27. 556 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1977).
28. Canadian Helicopters Ltd., 876 S.W.2d at 306.
29. Id. at 308.
30. Id. at 308-09.
31. Justices Hecht and Gonzalez, in dissent, refer to this exception as the "really clear"
abuse of discretion exception, though they state they do not know what the standard
means. Canadian Helicopters Ltd., 876 S.W.2d at 311. The dissent proposed avoiding fur-
ther complicated distinctions in mandamus review of orders on special appearance by hold-
ing that remedy by appeal is inadequate and focusing on whether the trial court's ruling is a
clear abuse of discretion, measured by the same standards as other mandamus cases, rather
than a "really clear" abuse of discretion standard. Id.
32. 878 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).
33. 878 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
34. 878 S.W.2d at 592.
35. Id at 592. KPERS is subject to lawsuits only to the extent sovereign immunity was
waived when the retirement system was created. Sovereign immunity was conditionally
waived only to the extent all actions against the system are filed in Shawnee County,
Kansas.
36. Id. at 591.
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eign."' 37 Mandamus review is appropriate, the court held, because such
potential harm "plainly goes beyond the additional time and expense or-
dinarily required to pursue an appeal, and beyond the immediate inter-
ests of the parties to the suit."'38
In Geary v. Peavy,39 the Texas Supreme Court formally recognized the
second Canadian Helicopters Ltd. exception - special appearances
where child custody is in issue. Geary involved a child custody dispute
fought in Minnesota and Texas. After Geary, who was appointed guard-
ian in the deceased father's will, obtained an ex parte order for temporary
custody of the children from a Minnesota court, the paternal grand-
mother filed a Suit Affecting Parent Child Relationship (SAPCR) in a
Houston court seeking appointment as sole managing conservator. The
Houston court subsequently named the grandmother sole managing con-
servator. Based on the temporary order from the Minnesota court,
Geary filed a habeas corpus petition in Houston as well as a motion to
vacate the SAPCR decree. The Houston court denied the motion to va-
cate. Geary did not appeal. The court subsequently denied Geary's
habeas corpus petition. The Minnesota court then rendered a final de-
cree, awarding custody to Geary. Geary sought mandamus relief in Texas
compelling the Houston court to vacate its SAPCR decree and dismiss
that proceeding for lack of jurisdiction.
Despite the fact that Geary could have appealed from the Houston
court's order denying her motion to vacate the SAPCR decree, the
supreme court nevertheless held that Geary could challenge the order
through a petition for writ of mandamus.40 The court declined to decide
if the rule announced in Dikeman v. Snell41 - that void or invalid trial
court judgments rendered without jurisdiction could be challenged by
mandamus - survived Walker v. Packer.42 Instead, the court held that
"the unique and compelling circumstances of this case dictate that [the
Dikeman rule] be applied here to resolve this jurisdictional dispute that
has led to conflicting child custody orders" regardless of "whether the
Dikeman rule still generally prevails. '43
2. Order Enforcing Void Foreign Judgment
The Texas Supreme Court's first opinion in Enis v. Smith" suggested
that Dikeman survived Walker v. Packer.45 The issue before the Enis
court was whether a Texas trial court should vacate its turnover order
against a debtor after the foreign judgment on which it was based was
37. Id. at 593.
38. Id. at 591.
39. 878 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 603.
41. 490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1973).
42. 827 S.W.2d 833, 140 (Tex. 1992).
43. Geary, 878 S.W.3d at 603.
44. 37 Tex. S. Ct. J. 1013 (June 15, 1994) (opinion withdrawn and substituted, 883
S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1994)).
45. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992).
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declared void. The court initially held that "[m]andamus will lie to set
aside a void order of a trial court without regard to the availability of a
remedy by appeal," citing Dikeman.46 It observed that the "theory un-
derlying this rule is that a void judgment needs no appellate action to
proclaim its invalidity."'47 Three months later it withdrew this opinion
and substituted an opinion changing the above-quoted language. The
court held that mandamus "will lie to set aside an order of a trial court
that seeks to enforce a foreign judgment [that] has been vacated by the
rendering foreign court."'48 The court no longer based its decision on the
general statement that mandamus was available to review void orders but
held that mandamus was appropriate in that case because the incompati-
bility of the appellate timetables of Texas and the foreign state could de-
prive litigants of the ability to file timely appeals of turnover orders in
Texas.49 In Enis the foreign court vacated its judgment more than thirty
days after the Texas trial court granted the turnover motion.50 The rela-
tor, therefore, had no adequate remedy by appeal because he had no
grounds for appeal until after the deadline for appealing the turnover or-
der had passed.51 Dikeman, therefore, if not dead, appears to be se-
verely debilitated.
The Texas Supreme Court's decisions in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. and
Enis demonstrate the court's intent announced in Walker v. Packer to
apply the adequate remedy requirement strictly to stem the increasing
tide of mandamus cases.
3. Order Compelling Arbitration without Agreement to Arbitrate
Extending the rationale of Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps,52 the Texas
Supreme Court held in Freis v. Canales,5 3 that a party who is compelled
to arbitrate without having agreed to do so has no adequate remedy on
appeal.54 In Freis, the relators/plaintiffs had contractually agreed with de-
fendants that, in the event of a dispute, the relators could seek concilia-
tion or arbitration. When a dispute arose, the relators inquired about
conciliation. Then one defendant moved the court to order arbitration,
but the trial court ordered the parties to mediation; when mediation
failed to resolve the dispute, the trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to compel arbitration. 55 The relators sought mandamus relief. Find-
ing that the relators' participation in the mediation was the "functional
equivalent" of conciliation, the Texas Supreme Court held that the de-
46. Enis, 37 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 1014 (opinion withdrawn and substituted, 883 S.W.2d 662
(Tex. 1994)).
47. Id.




52. 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992).
53. 877 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
54. Id. at 284.
55. Id. at 283.
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fendant had no contractual right to compel the relators to arbitrate their
claim, and the trial court had no power to order arbitration. 56 Ordinary
appeal is not an adequate remedy from such an order, the court con-
cluded, because, just as a party denied its bargained-for right to arbitra-
tion has no adequate remedy by appeal,57 a party compelled to arbitrate
without having agreed to do so will lose its right to have the dispute re-
solved by litigation.58
4. Order Reinstating Case After Expiration of Plenary Power
Mandamus will issue when a trial court erroneously reinstates a case
after the expiration of the court's plenary jurisdiction.59 In Howley v.
Haberman the trial court dismissed the underlying lawsuit for want of
prosecution.60 More than ninety days later, the plaintiff filed a motion to
reinstate, alleging that she had learned of the dismissal only two weeks
earlier. The trial court reinstated the case. The defendant moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the trial court had no power to reinstate.
Conditionally issuing writ, the Texas Supreme Court held that under the
rules of procedure, a party who does not have actual knowledge of an
order of dismissal within ninety days of the date it is signed cannot move
for reinstatement.61 Since the plaintiff did not learn of the dismissal
within the ninety-day period, the order of dismissal was final and the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the subsequent proceedings.62 The plain-
tiff's only possible recourse, therefore, was by bill of review.
5. Order Disqualifying Counsel
Observing that a party who fails to file a motion to disqualify opposing
counsel in a timely manner waives the complaint, the Texas Supreme
Court in Vaughan v. Walther63 held that mandamus is proper when a trial
court grants an untimely motion to disqualify because the order of dis-
qualification is an abuse of discretion that cannot be remedied by
appeal.64
6. Order Excluding Expert Witnesses
Mandamus may be proper where a trial court excludes all of a plain-
tiff's expert witnesses. In Thomas v. Ray65 the parties entered into an
agreement whereby Thomas was to designate all experts by February 17,
1993. The plaintiff's attorney presented verified and uncontroverted
56. Id.
57. See Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992).
58. Freis, 877 S.W.2d at 284.
59. Howley v. Haberman, 878 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
60. Id at 139.
61. Id at 140 (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 306a(4) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
62. Id.
63. 875 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 690-91.
65. 889 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).
[Vol. 48
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proof through his affidavit that the designation of experts was mailed on
February 3. The defendant failed to offer any proof to rebut the pre-
sumption that the designation had been received. 66 Under such circum-
stances, the exclusion of witnesses is an abuse of discretion by the trial
court and there is no adequate remedy by appeal.67
7. Order to produce privileged documents
Mandamus may be proper where a trial court abuses its discretion in
determining that a party has waived an asserted privilege under the "of-
fensive use" doctrine. The discovery dispute in TransAmerican Natural
Gas Corp. v. Flores,68 arose out of conspiracy claim against Coastal Oil &
Gas Corporation (Coastal) and Valero Transmission Company (Valero)
alleging the manipulation of gas prices in a gas purchase agreement.
TransAmerican objected to one of Valero's requests for documents on
the grounds that certain documents were protected by the attorney-client,
work product, and/or party communication privileges. Valero sought a
motion to compel discovery. The trial court granted that motion in part,
finding that the privileges for two of the withheld documents were waived
under the "offensive use" doctrine. 69 TransAmerican sought mandamus
relief from this order; the court of appeals denied it. The Texas Supreme
Court reversed, granting mandamus.
In granting mandamus, the Texas Supreme Court reviewed the docu-
ments and determined that they did not meet the second and third prongs
of the "offensive use" doctrine. Specifically, the court concluded as to the
second prong that "[i]t is difficult for us to conclude that, even if believed
by the fact finder, in all probability, these documents would determine
the outcome of Valero's case."' 70 As to the third prong, the court con-
cluded that "Valero has not proved that the disclosure of the confidential
communication is the only means by which the aggrieved party may ob-
tain that evidence."' 71 The court held that the trial court's error in apply-
ing the "offensive use" test constituted a clear abuse of discretion. 72
Finally, the court reiterated that a party has no adequate remedy on ap-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 238. As a rule of thumb, practitioners should obtain proof of mailing to
support any claim of mailing.
68. 870 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
69. The Texas Supreme Court set out the test for the application of the offensive use
doctrine in Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1993). Before a party can be
found to have waived an asserted privilege under this doctrine, it must be determined that:
(1) The party asserting the privilege is seeking affirmative relief;
(2) the privileged information sought is such that, if believed by the fact
finder, in all probability it would be outcome determinative of the cause of
action asserted;(3) disclosure of the confidential communication is the only means by which
the aggrieved party may obtain the evidence.
Id at 163.
70. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp., 870 S.W.2d at 11.
71. Id.
72. Id. Even though the application of the test turned on the interpretation of docu-
ments, the failure to correctly apply a legal standard is an error of law.
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peal when the trial court erroneously orders the disclosure of privileged
information that will materially affect the rights of the aggrieved party.73
8 Refusal to Grant Timely-Filed Uncontested Affidavit of Inability to
Pay Costs
The trial court in Rios v. Calhoon74 refused the appellant's timely-filed
and uncontested affidavit of inability to pay costs pursuant to Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(3)(A). 75 The appellant sought a writ of
mandamus in the court of appeals directing the trial court to order the
preparation and delivery of both a partial transcript and a partial state-
ment of facts at no cost.76 The court of appeals conditionally granted the
writ but only ordered the preparation and delivery of the statement of
facts, authorizing the trial court to determine whether the appellant had
funds available to make partial payment for the statement of facts.77 The
court of appeals also overruled the appellant's request for a extension of
time to file his brief pending receipt of the transcript. The trial court
thereafter ordered the preparation and delivery of the statement of facts
at a cost of $100 to the appellant. 78
Conditionally granting writ, the Texas Supreme Court held that if a
party properly perfects an appeal by filing an affidavit of inability to pay
costs under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(3)(A), the party is
"absolutely entitled" to the exemption from paying costs on appeal.79
The trial court, therefore, abused its discretion by ordering the appellant
to pay $100 for the preparation of the statement of facts and by failing to
order production of the transcript. The court further held that the court
of appeals abused its discretion in overruling the appellant's motion for
extension of time to file his appellate brief because his request was based
on his inability to obtain the transcription for preparation of an adequate
appellate brief.80
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
A party is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a
summary judgment motion if the motion is based on sovereign immu-
nity.8' Only if the motion is based on an assertion of qualified immunity
does section 54.014(5) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
permit interlocutory appeal.82
73. Id.
74. 889 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).





80. Id. at 259.
81. City of Mission v. Ramirez, 865 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no
writ).
82. Id. at 582. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
Section 51.014 also allows interlocutory appeals from an order (1) appointing a receiver or
[Vol. 48
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In City of Mission v. Ramirez a city employee sued the city and city
officials for wrongful termination, slander and conspiracy.83 Although
the governmental employees had available to them the affirmative de-
fense of qualified immunity in their individual capacity, the individual de-
fendants sued in Ramirez did not move for summary judgment on that
basis. Moreover, the city/defendant moved for summary judgment based
only on sovereign immunity. Recognizing that a city's claims may be
based on its employees' claim of qualified immunity, the court dismissed
the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the appellants' grounds for
summary judgment here were not based on qualified immunity, and sec-
tion 51.014(5) did not afford them an interlocutory appeal from the denial
of their summary judgment motion.84
III. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
A. OBJECTING TO THE CHARGE
In keeping with the Texas Supreme Court's attempt to alleviate some
of the complexity of preserving charge error as announced in State De-
partment of Highways & Public Transportation v. Payne,85 the supreme
court held during the last Survey period in Spencer v. Eagle Star Insur-
ance Co. of America that an objection to a defective instruction without
submission of an alternative is sufficient to preserve error for appellate
review.86 Although Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 278 states that the
"[f]ailure to submit a definition or instruction shall not be deemed a
ground for reversal of the judgment unless a substantially correct defini-
tion or instruction has been requested in writing and tendered by the
party complaining of the judgment," this rule applies to omitted instruc-
tions not defective instructions.87 The rule applicable to defective in-
structions is Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 274, which provides:
[a] party objecting to a charge must point out distinctly the objec-
tionable matter and the grounds for the objection. Any complaint as
to a question, definition, or instruction, on account of any defect,
omission or fault in pleading, is waived unless specifically included in
the objections.88
The court in Spencer held that an objection alone is sufficient to preserve
error in a defective instruction, and a request of substantially correct lan-
guage is not required. 89
trustee; (2) overruling a motion to vacate an order appointing a receiver or trustee; (3)
certifying or refusing to certify a class; (4) granting or refusing to grant a temporary injunc-
tion or granting or overruling a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction; and (6) denying
a motion for summary judgment based upon a claim against a member of the electronic or
print media arising under the free speech clause of the U.S. Constitution.
83. 865 S.W.2d at 580.
84. Id.
85. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
86. 876 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1994).
87. TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
88. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274.
89. 876 S.W.2d at 157.
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Notably, however, this attempt to alleviate the complexity of objecting
to the charge does not relieve the litigant of his duty to make his objec-
tions specific. For example, in Hart v. Berko, Inc.,9o a case involving
Texas Insurance Code and DTPA allegations, the El Paso Court of Ap-
peals held that the appellants had waived their complaint that the imposi-
tion of treble damages under the Insurance Code was erroneous based on
the multifarious nature of the "conduct" jury question that allowed the
jury to answer "Yes" without finding that appellants had engaged in spe-
cific conduct that would give rise to treble damages.91 The waiver oc-
curred because appellants' objections to the charge included only
objections based on a claim of redundancy and a complaint that the
charge did not limit the jury to consideration of the misrepresentation
that was the basis of the lawsuit. The objections were not based on the
applicability of the Insurance Code trebling provision.92 The court held
that the appellants failed to make a sufficiently specific objection to the
charge to inform the court of the nature of their complaints and, there-
fore, failed to preserve error.93
According to the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, the Texas Supreme
Court's holding in Payne does not alleviate the litigant's duty to strictly
observe the timing requirements of Rule 273 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure when objecting to the trial court's refusal to submit a special
issue to the jury. In Alaniz v. Jones & Neuse, Inc.,94 the court held that
the appellant had waived any error in the trial court's refusal to submit
his special issue on future lost profits because, although he had submitted
the requested issue in substantially correct and written form in his pro-
posed charge filed before trial, he failed to submit it again after the trial
court presented the draft charge to all counsel and parties.95 Although
recalling the court's holding in State Department of Highways v. Payne96
that the "one test" for determining if a party has preserved error in the
jury charge is "whether the party made the trial court aware of the com-
plaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling, '97 the Corpus Christi
court in Alaniz concluded that, despite the fact that the appellant proba-
bly effectively alerted the trial court of his objection and obtained an rul-
ing, his failure to comply with Rule 273's clear requirement regarding the
timing of submitting proposed jury questions rendered any error
waived. 98 Rule 273, the Alaniz court held, sets out three requirements
for requests: "that they be written, submitted after presentation of the
90. 881 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
91. Id. at 509.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 878 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994), writ denied per curiam, No. 94-
0767, 1995 WL 217816 (Tex. Apr. 13, 1995).
95. Id. at 245.
96. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
97. Id. at 241.
98. Alaniz, 878 S.W.2d at 244.
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draft charge, and submitted separately from any objections." 99 Since the
appellant's submission of the omitted question in writing was only part of
a complete proposed charge filed before trial, he failed to comply with
Rule 273 and his error was not preserved. The result in Alaniz seems
harshly inconsistent with the policy expressed in Payne.100
B. SUBMITTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
1. Authenticating Deposition Excerpts
Overruling the Dallas Court of Appeals' holding in Deerfield Land
Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co., the Texas Supreme Court in
McConathy v. McConathy'0 held that under the 1990 amendment to
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(d), deposition excerpts submitted as
summary judgment evidence do not need to be authenticated by attorney
affidavit or court reporter's certificate.' 0 2 The court held that Rule
166a(d) outlines the procedures for use of unfiled discovery products as
summary judgment evidence and supersedes any authentication require-
ment, including that stated in Deerfield.10 3
2. Referencing Summary Judgment Evidence in Accompanying Brief
In an extension of the Rule announced in McConnell v. Southside In-
dependent School District'°4 that the grounds on which a movant relies
must be expressly presented within the summary judgment motion itself,
the Tyler Court of Appeals in Burford v. Wilson held that the motion
must also specifically refer to the evidence in support of the grounds for
summary judgment.105 In Burford, the defendants each filed motions for
summary judgment based on the applicable statute of limitations.1°6
With their motions, the defendants simultaneously filed briefs more spe-
cifically stating their positions and referencing the evidence that sup-
ported the motions. 107 The defendants did not incorporate the briefs or
99. Id. at 245.
100. Id. After this Article went to print, the Texas Supreme Court, in a per curiam
denial of Alaniz's application for writ of error, disapproved of the Corpus Christi court's
opinion in this regard, concluding that Alaniz preserved his jury charge complaint. Alaniz,
1995 WL 217816 at *2. The supreme court held that "[w]hile Payne does not revise the
requirements of the rules of procedure regarding the jury charge, it does mandate that
those requirements be applied in a common sense manner to serve the purposes of the
rules, rather than in a technical manner which defeats them." Id. The court denied writ,
however, because Alaniz had neither pleadings nor legally sufficient evidence to support
submission on the jury question at issue. Id.
101. 869 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1994).
102. 758 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
103. Id. at 342. Rule 166a(d) requires a statement of intent to use unfiled discovery as
summary judgment proof. The supreme court held that this requirement is satisfied by
attaching the discovery to the motion or response and clearly referencing the party's reli-
ance upon the attached discovery. Id. at n.2.
104. 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993). See also Sysco Food Service, Inc. v. aTapnell, 890
S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994).
105. 885 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App.-yler 1994, writ requested).




the evidence attached to the briefs within the motions. The trial court
granted the defendants' motions and rendered a take-nothing judgment
against the plaintiffs.
The Tyler Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judg-
ment. 108 The court noted that while the defendants' motions sufficiently
stated the grounds for their summary judgment as required by McCon-
nell, under the precise language of Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, evidence relied upon in a motion or a response to a motion
for summary judgment must also be "referenced or set forth in the mo-
tion or response."'1 9 The defendants' motions did not refer to their briefs
or to any evidence to support the motions. "until Rule 166a(c) states
otherwise," the court concluded "we hold that the movant must expressly
present the grounds upon which he relies and must specifically refer to
the evidence to support those grounds within the motion for summary
judgment, and may not rely on briefs not referred to or incorporated
within the motion."110
3. Incorporating by Reference Grounds Asserted in Codefendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment
In Camden Machine & Tool, Inc. v. Cascade Co."' a summary judg-
ment movant incorporated by reference the summary judgment grounds
stated in its codefendants' summary judgment motions." 2 Reversing the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of the movant, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals held that under McConnell,113 a party's motion for
summary judgment itself must assert grounds and establish entitlement to
summary judgment. Referencing and incorporating the grounds stated in
other parties' motions is insufficient as a matter of law to present grounds
to support the summary judgment." 14
4. Pleadings and Discovery on File Reflecting Genuine Issues as to
Material Facts
In Barragan v. Mosler" 5 the defendant/appellee moved for summary
judgment." 6 The plaintiff/appellant never filed a written response to the
motion for summary judgment, and the trial court rendered summary
judgment in favor of the defendant. At the time of summary judgment,
various discovery responses and pleadings were on file in the case. Rely-
ing on Rule 166a(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellant
challenged the trial court's judgment on the basis that the pleadings, dis-
108. Id. at 255.
109. Id. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (Vernon 1976).
110. Burford, 885 S.W.2d at 256.
111. 870 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
112. Id. at 310.
113. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993).
114. Camden, 870 S.W.2d at 310.
115. 872 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
116. Id. at 21.
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covery responses, admissions and answers to interrogatories on file at the
time of judgment reflected that there were genuine issues of material
fact.117
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals rejected the appellant's argu-
ment, holding that although it might appear from Rule 166a(c) that inter-
rogatory answers, pleadings and admissions are proper summary
judgment evidence, well-established case law severely limits the trial
court's ability to consider such evidence in the summary judgment con-
text.118 Moreover, summary judgment proof must be attached to the sum-
mary judgment motion or response." 9 Affirming the trial court's
judgment, the court of appeals noted that not only did the appellants fail
to attach any evidence to a summary judgment response, the appellants
failed to even file a summary judgment response. 120
C. PRESERVING ERROR THROUGH MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL FILED
AND OVERRULED BEFORE ENTRY OF REFORMED JUDGMENT
A timely motion for new trial, overruled by operation of law before
entry of a reformed judgment, preserves error to the extent the motion
for new trial is applicable to the reformed judgment. 121 The defendant in
Fredonia State Bank v. General Am. Life Ins. Co. filed its motion for new
trial following the trial court's initial entry of judgment.' 22 The motion
was overruled by operation of law, after which the trial court entered a
modified judgment, deleting the award of attorneys' fees. The defendant
did not file another motion for new trial. 23 The appellee argued that
since the appellant did not challenge the subsequent judgment by a mo-
tion for new trial, the appellant waived any complaint about the factual
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 24 The appellant
argued that its motion for new trial preserved error in the subsequent
modified judgment under Rule 58(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, which provides that "[i]n civil cases, if the trial court has signed
an order modifying, correcting, or reforming the order appealed from, or
has vacated that order and signed another, any proceedings relating to an
appeal of the first order may be considered applicable to the
second .... "125
Accepting the appellant's position, the Texas Supreme Court held that
under Rule 58(c), "a motion for new trial relating to an earlier judgment
may be considered applicable to a second judgment when the substance
of the motion could properly be raised with respect to the corrected judg-
117. Id. TEX. R. Crv. P. 166a(c) (Vernon 1976).
118. Barragan, 872 S.W.2d. at 21.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994).
122. Id. at 280.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 281.
125. Id. TEX. R. App. P. 58(c) (Pamph. 1994).
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ment."'1 26 Disapproving of the Dallas Court of Appeals' interpretation of
Rule 58 in A.G. Solar & Co., Inc. v. Nordyke127 and approving the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals, First District's analysis in Harris County Hospital
Dist. v. Estrada,128 the court held that the motion preserves error in the
later judgment even if overruled by operation of law prior to entry of the
later judgment. 129 To read into the rules a requirement that a redundant
motion for new trial is necessary to preserve error, the court concluded,
"would defeat the goal of hearing cases on their merits whenever possi-
ble, without advancing any corresponding policy considerations.' 130
D. SUBMITrING EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Affidavits attached to a motion for new trial following a default judg-
ment do not have to be offered into evidence in order to be considered by
the trial court in determining whether the default judgment should be set
aside and a new trial ordered under the test set forth in Craddock v. Sun-
shine Bus Lines, Inc.131 The plaintiff in Director, State Employees Work-
ers' Compensation Div. v. Evans132 obtained a default judgment, and the
defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial. 133
The defendant attached supporting affidavits to its motion for new trial
but did not introduce the affidavits into evidence at the motion for new
trial hearing. 134 The trial court refused to set aside the default judgment
and grant a new trial, and the court of appeals affirmed the lower court,
holding that the trial court could not consider the affidavits attached to
the motion because they were not introduced at the hearing. 135 Revers-
ing the court of appeals, the supreme court held that "[iut is sufficient that
the affidavits are attached to the motion for new trial and are part of the
record. "136
E. PRESERVATION OF APPELLATE POINTS
The Texas Supreme Court's holding in Fredonia State Bank v. Gen.
Am. Life Ins. Co.137 emphasizes that Rule 74(f) requires specificity in
support of reply points.' 38 An appellee cannot respond with conclusory
statements but must address the specific statements of fact and references
126. Fredonia, 881 S.W.2d at 281.
127. 744 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
128. 831 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
129. Fredonia, 881 S.W.2d at 282.
130. Id. The court explicitly declined to resolve the conflict between Solar and Estrada
on the question of whether a motion for new trial overruled by operation of law is effective
to extend the appellate deadline from a subsequent judgment. Id. at 282 n.2.
131. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
132. 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994).




137. 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994).
138. See TEX. R. App. P. 74(f).
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to the record in the appellant's brief.139 Otherwise, the appellate court
may accept them as true.140 Rebriefing may not be allowed, 141 so appel-
lees are well-advised to give detailed statements of fact and to support
reply points with specific citations to the record and to case law.
IV. FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS
A final judgment subject to appeal must dispose of all issues and all
parties.142 In Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc.,143 a multi-defend-
ant products liability action, the trial court granted a summary judgment
motion filed by some, but not all, defendants. 144 After doing so, the trial
court signed a severance order purporting to make the judgment final and
appealable. The order contained a standard "Mother Hubbard" clause,
but it also purported to allow additional defendants to file late summary
judgment motions after the date of the order and thus become severed
into an appealable judgment.
The Texas Supreme Court observed that, on its face, the trial court's
severance order allowed defendants to be added after the time allowed
for appeal had expired.' 45 This procedure, according to the court, "cre-
ates an inherent conflict between the two rules that appellate deadlines
run from the signing of the order, and that a party cannot be subject to
the appeal until the judgment or order actually applies to the party."'1 46
As a result, the court concluded, the severance order was not only inter-
locutory as to the added parties because all the parties disposed of were
not specified as of the date the order was signed, it was also interlocutory
as to the defendants originally moving for summary judgment. 47 The
"order necessarily contemplate[d] a later 'final' order unambiguously
designating all parties encompassed by the order as of the date it is
signed."'148
In Springer v. Spruiell,149 the supreme court emphasized its holding
from the last Survey period in Mafrige v. Ross 50 by reversing the
Amarillo Court of Appeals' dismissal for want of jurisdiction. In dis-
139. Fredonia, 881 S.W.2d at 283. General American challenged on appeal a jury find-
ing that an insurance application was not attached to the policy. It cited specific facts from
the record. The bank replied: "THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE JURY'S ANSWER TO QUESTION 2 AND 3 [in which the jury found the applica-
tions were not attached to the policies]." "Rather than support the point with record cita-
tions, however, the Bank argued that General American's points were moot because of the
failure of the jury to find misrepresentation." Id This response was insufficient. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 284-85.
142. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966).
143. 875 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1994).
144. Id. at 313.
145. Id. (citing TEX. R. App. P. 5(b)(1)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Martinez, 875 S.W.2d at 313.
149. 866 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1993).
150. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
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missing the appeal, the Amarillo court reasoned that since Rule 166a of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires the specific grounds support-
ing summary judgment to be set forth in the motion for summary judg-
ment, "it is axiomatic that one may not be granted judgment as a matter
of law on a cause of action not addressed in the summary judgment mo-
tion. ' 151 Since the motions for summary judgment in that case addressed
only one of the plaintiffs' five live causes of action, the court of appeals
concluded that the judgments were interlocutory and unappealable, de-
spite the "Mother Hubbard" language in the summary judgments.152
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that,
under Mafrige, the express language in the judgment purporting to dis-
pose of all claims makes the summary judgment final and appealable, in
apparent disregard of the limited grounds upon which the summary judg-
ment rests.15
3
When a judgment disposes of all named parties except those who have
not been served and have not appeared, the judgment is considered final
for purposes of appeal.' 54 In Ballard v. Portnoy, the trial court granted
summary judgment on October 13, 1993 in favor of a doctor, who, along
with a drugstore, were named defendants in a wrongful death action.' 55
On November 12, 1993, the plaintiff filed a second amended petition
naming a nurse a third defendant. On December 22, 1993, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the drug store defendant. The
newly named nurse was never served with citation. On January 27, 1994,
the trial court signed a "final judgment" ordering that the plaintiff take
nothing from the physician or the drug store on any theory. The court's
order did not address the plaintiff's claims against the nurse. The plain-
tiff thereafter filed an affidavit of inability to pay, which the defendants
contested, and the trial court sustained the contest on February 18, 1994.
On March 8, 1994, the plaintiff filed a cost bond. The court of appeals
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that the January 27,
1994 judgment was final because the nurse was never served and never
appeared, and the plaintiff filed neither a motion for new trial nor a mo-
tion for an extension of time to file a cost bond.156 The plaintiff's cost
bond, therefore, was due within thirty days after the judgment was signed
(February 27, 1994) or ten days after the court sustained the contest (Feb-
ruary 28, 1994). The plaintiff's cost bond, filed March 8, 1994, was, there-
fore, untimely. 157
151. Springer v. First Nat'l Bank of Plainview, Texas, 866 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1992), rev'd sub nom. Springer v. Spruiell, 866 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
152. Id. at 631.
153. Springer v. Spruiell, 866 S.W.2d 593, 593 (Tex. 1993).
154. Ballard v. Portnoy, 886 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
155. Id. at 445.
156. Id. at 447.
157. Id. at 446.
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In Fandey v. Lee158 the court of appeals noted that the well-established
rule that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment that disposes
of all issues and parties applies to summary judgments. 159 A summary
judgment in a bill of review proceeding, the court concluded, which
merely sets aside a prior judgment and reinstates a case dismissed for
want of prosecution without disposing of all of the issues of the reinstated
case on the merits, is interlocutory in nature and not a final appealable
judgment. 160
V. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
A. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
For purposes of calculating the appellate timetable, the date of "filing"
a motion for new trial is when the document is first tendered to the clerk,
even if the requisite statutory filing fee is not paid at that time. 161 The
motion is conditionally filed on the date it is tendered, and the filing is
completed when the fee is paid. 162 In Jamar v. Patterson the appellant
tendered his motion for new trial to the district clerk within thirty days
after judgment, but the clerk did not "accept" the motion for filing be-
cause the appellant had not paid the requisite statutory filing fee. 163 The
clerk file-stamped the motion when the appellant paid the filing fee,
which was more than thirty days after judgment. The appellant then filed
an appeal bond, which was timely only if his motion for new trial was
timely filed to extend the appellate deadline. 1' The court of appeals dis-
missed the appeal, stating that the motion for new trial was filed when it
was file-stamped, rather than when it was tendered. The Texas Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the
date of filing is when the document is first tendered to the clerk, not the
date the filing fee is paid.' 65
Following Jamar, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held in Ramirez
v. Get "N" Go # 103,166 that the appellant's failure to pay the filing fee for
his motion for new trial did not affect appellate deadlines. 167 Notably,
the motion for new trial in Ramirez was overruled by operation of law
before the movant paid the filing fee. In fact, the filing fee was not paid
until 11 months after the motion was tendered. Interpreting the Texas
Supreme Court's language in Jamar that filing without a fee is a "condi-
tional filing," the Corpus Christi court held that if a movant fails to pay
the required fee before the motion is ruled on or overruled by operation
158. 876 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1994, no writ).
159. Id. at 459.
160. Id.
161. Jamar v. Patterson, 868 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 318.
164. Id.
165. Id at 319.
166. 888 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
167. Id at 30.
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of law, the failure does not affect appellate deadlines but does affect the
trial court's discretion to hear and determine the motion.168 The trial
court should refuse to consider the motion. The court observed that the
movant may waive the specific grounds raised in the motion for new trial,
but the court did not decide this issue. 169
In Spellman v. Hoang170 the movant's motion for new trial was heard
and ruled on months before the filing fee was paid. 171 The San Antonio
court noted the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Jamar that "[t]he filing
is not completed until the fee is paid, and absent emergency or other rare
circumstances, the court should not consider [the motion for new trial]
before then.' 72 The court observed but did not decide that under Jamar
the failure to pay the filing fee before the expiration of the trial court's
plenary jurisdiction may nullify the trial court's hearing and ruling on the
motion for new trial. 173 Late payment, however, will retroactively com-
plete the filing as of the date of tender in order to extend the appellate
timetable. 174
B. REQUEST FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Texas Supreme Court recently resolved a split among the courts of
appeals on the issue of whether, in a summary judgment proceeding, the
filing of a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law extends the
appellate deadlines under Rule 41(a)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 75 Both the Dallas and Amarillo courts of appeals previously
held that such a request does not extend the thirty-day time limit; the El
Paso Court of Appeals held that it does.176 The El Paso court in Chavez
reasoned that the filing of a request for findings and conclusions in a sum-
mary judgment case is analogous to those situations where courts of ap-
peals have found that defective motions for new trial, although preserving
nothing for review, nevertheless extend time for perfecting an appeal.'
77
These cases focus on the timeliness of the post-judgment motion, rather
than on its content or effectiveness, in determining whether the motion
extended appellate deadlines. 78 The Chavez court further noted that
neither a motion for new trial nor a request for findings and conclusions
is actually the proper post-judgment filing in a summary judgment
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 887 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 481 (quoting Jamar, 868 S.W.2d at 319 n.3) (First alteration in original).
173. Id.
174. Id
175. Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 885 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
176. Compare Linwood v. NCNB of Texas, 876 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Dallas), rev'd
on other grounds, 885 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1994) and Besing v. Moffitt, 882 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1994, n.w.h.) with Chavez v. Housing Authority, 876 S.W.2d 416 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1994), opinion withdrawn and substituted, No. 08-93-00422-CV, 1995 WL
221764 (Tex. App.-E! Paso, Apr. 13, 1995, n.w.h.).
177. 876 S.W.2d at 417.
178. Id.
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case.179 The more accurate name for the proper post-judgment pleading
in the summary judgment context would be a "motion for reconsidera-
tion," but, the court noted, the rules of appellate procedure do not men-
tion such a pleading. 80 "Thus, a literal reading of TEX. R. App. P. 41
would preclude any extension of appellate deadlines in summary judg-
ment cases," and the court did not believe the drafters intended this re-
sult.181 It, therefore, ruled that the request for findings and conclusions
did extend the deadline. 182
In support of the position that a request for findings and conclusions
does not operate to extend the appellate deadlines, the Amarillo court in
Besing noted that the "Texas Supreme Court has held that a motion for
new trial is not 'necessarily inappropriate'" in the summary judgment
context,183 but "the cases are legion holding that findings of fact and con-
clusions of law have no place in summary judgment proceedings.' 184 In
fact, the court noted, where such findings are made, they are correctly
disregarded by the appellate court.185 Thus, the court concluded, in view
of the "longstanding, consistent and repeated holdings of the various
courts that have determined that requests for findings of fact are inappro-
priate when the trial court decides a case by summary judgment .... a
request for such findings does not operate to extend the appellate timeta-
bles in such instances."' 86 The Dallas Court of Appeals made a similar
analysis in Linwood.187
The Texas Supreme Court resolved the dispute by agreeing with the
Dallas Court of Appeals in Linwood. The court held that "[b]ecause
findings of fact and conclusions of law have no place in a summary judg-
ment proceeding, the timetable [is] not extended." 188 The court agreed
that the language "tried without a jury" in Rule 41(a)(1) does not include





183. See Besing v. Moffitt, 882 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, n.w.h,) (citing




187. Linwood v. NCNB of Texas, 876 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Dallas), rev'd on other
grounds, 885 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1994).
188. Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 885 S.W.2d 102, 102 (Tex. 1994)(per curiam). Notably,
the El Paso court subsequently withdrew its original opinion in Chavez as having been
"implicitly overruled" by Linwood. Chavez v. Housing Authority, No. 08-93-0042-CV,
1995 WL 221764, *1 (Tex. App.-E! Paso, Apr. 13, 1995, n.w.h.).
189. Nonetheless, the court reversed the Dallas Court of Appeals in Linwood because,
although the appellant had filed only an ineffective notice of appeal and an ineffective
request for findings and conclusions, he did file a cost bond, albeit 53 days after the judg-
ment was signed. Id. The supreme court held that, although the notice of appeal was the
improper instrument to perfect appeal, the court of appeals, before dismissing the appeal,
should have given the appellant an opportunity to correct his error by substituting the
correct instrument. Id The appellant, the court concluded, "made a bona fide attempt to
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VI. PLENARY POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT
The trial court has plenary power or jurisdiction over a case for thirty
days after the judgment is signed, 19° or, if a motion for new trial is timely
filed, for thirty days after the timely-filed motion is overruled either by a
signed order or by operation of law, whichever occurs first.' 9 '
The Texas Supreme Court recently held in Porter v. Vick 192 that, at any
time during its plenary power over a judgment, a trial court may vacate
an order granting a new trial, or "ungrant" a new trial.193 An order va-
cating an order granting a new trial, however, is void if it is signed after
the trial court's plenary power has expired.' 94
Conditionally granting a writ of mandamus, the Texas Supreme Court
further held in Howley v. Haberman that a trial court may not reinstate a
case dismissed for want of prosecution when the order was signed after its
plenary power has expired.' 95 "A party who does not have actual knowl-
edge of an order of dismissal within 90 days of the date it is signed cannot
move for reinstatement," the court held.' 96 Under these circumstances, a
bill of review proceeding is the party's only recourse to challenge the trial
court's dismissal order.197
In a similar case addressing the trial court's power to act after expira-
tion of its plenary jurisdiction, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held
in City of McAllen v. Ramirez' 98 that a trial court does not have the
power to grant an unverified motion to reinstate a case dismissed for
want of prosecution after its plenary jurisdiction has expired. 199 The
court further noted that a plaintiff cannot circumvent the verification re-
quirements of Rule 165a(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by
merely changing the caption of its motion to a motion for new trial.200
"The provisions of rule 165a," the court concluded, "require such a mo-
tion to be verified, regardless of what label the plaintiff chooses to put on
it."o201 Thus, an unverified "Motion to Reinstate and for New Trial" is
ineffective to extend the trial court's jurisdiction over the dismissal be-
yond thirty days.202
invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction sufficient to prevent dismissal for want of jurisdic-
tion,..." Id.
190. "Plenary" is a formal word for "full." BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 419 (1987). The trial court's "plenary" power or jurisdiction,
therefore, includes "[flull and complete" authority over the subject matter as well as the
parties to a controversy. BLACK'S LAW DICrnONARY 1039 (5th ed. 1979).
191. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d)-(e).
192. 888 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1994) (Tex. June 2, 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
193. Id. at 789.
194. Id.
195. 878 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
196. Id. at 140 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4)).
197. Id. at 140.
198. 875 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (orig. proceeding).
199. Id. at 705.
200. Id.
201. Id. (discussing TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(3)).
202. Ramirez, 875 S.W.2d at 705.
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VII. PERFECTION OF APPEAL
A. BONA FIDE A'TTEMPT TO INVOKE APPELLATE COURT
JURISDICTION
In Blankenship v. Robins,203 after granting summary judgment against
one of three defendants, the trial court signed an order stating that a new
cause number would be assigned for the claims against the remaining de-
fendants, leaving the summary judgment under the original cause
number.204 The abstract of judgment issued by the clerk, however, stated
that the summary judgment would receive the new cause number.20 5 The
trial court and the parties followed the abstract of judgment. The appel-
lant used the new cause number on appeal from the summary judg-
ment.206 The court of appeals dismissed the appeal from the summary
judgment for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant's motion for new
trial and appeal bond were not filed in the same cause as the judgment.20 7
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' dismissal, rea-
soning that a party should not be punished for failure to comply with the
terms of an order "ignored by both the opposing party and the court. 20 8
The court held that the appellant's actions constituted a bona fide at-
tempt to invoke the appellate court jurisdiction.2°9
Similarly, in Maxfield v. Terry,210 the Texas Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court's dismissal of an appeal for want of jurisdiction be-
cause appellant made a "bona fide attempt" to invoke the court's jurisdic-
tion.211 Specifically, the appellant in Maxfield filed a single cash deposit
in lieu of bond to appeal from two final and appealable orders rendered
in the same probate proceeding under different cause numbers. After
oral argument, the court of appeals dismissed one of the cases for want of
jurisdiction, holding that the appellant was required to file a separate cost
bond, cash deposit, or affidavit of inability to pay for each of the probate
court's final orders.212 Reversing the appellate court's dismissal, the
Texas Supreme Court stated that under its policy of liberally construing
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals should have given
the appellant the opportunity to correct any defect in the appeal before
dismissing.213 The appellant "made a bona fide attempt to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court of appeals by filing one 'instrument' for both
probate orders. '214




207. Blankenship, 878 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
208. Id. at 139.
209. Id.
210. 888 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
211. Id. at 2.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2.
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B. MEASURING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
When a judgment is signed following a nonsuit, the appellate timetable
runs from the date of the latter order unless the trial court issued the
latter order solely for the purpose of extending the appellate timetable. 21 5
In Mackie v. McKenzie,216 the trial court signed an order granting an in-
terlocutory summary judgment in favor of McKenzie on January 8, 1993,
but the summary judgment order did not discuss or dispose of the coun-
terclaim filed by McKenzie against Mackie. 217 McKenzie filed a motion
to nonsuit his counterclaim and the trial court signed an order nonsuiting
the claim on June 1, 1993.218 At Mackie's request, the trial court signed a
"Final Judgment on June 25, 1993," clearly delineating the disposition of
McKenzie's motion for summary judgment as well as the counterclaim. 21 9
The order also contained a standard "Mother Hubbard" clause.220
Dismissing Mackie's subsequent appeal for want of jurisdiction, the
court of appeals held that the appellate timetable began to run when the
order of nonsuit was signed-not when the Final Judgment was signed.
As a result, Mackie's cost bond was untimely.221 The Texas Supreme
Court disagreed. Recognizing that a second judgment that serves no pur-
pose other than to enlarge the time of appeal is without effect, the Texas
Supreme Court held that under Rule 329b(h) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, "any change, whether or not material or substantial, made in
a judgment while the trial court retains plenary power, operates to delay
the commencement of the appellate timetable until the date the modified,
corrected or reformed judgment is signed."222 The court of appeals erred
when it failed to measure the appellate timetable from the date of the
June 25, 1993 order because that order varied the previous "final" judg-
ment by stating that the interlocutory summary judgment and nonsuit or-
der were final and by adding the "Mother Hubbard" language; the court
issued the order while it still had plenary power over the case and there is
no indication that the court issued the order solely for the purpose of
extending the appellate timetable.223
C. PROVING INSUFFICIENT NOTICE OF ADVERSE JUDGMENT
The Texas Supreme Court held in Cantu v. Longoria2 24 that a trial
court's refusal to conduct a hearing as required by Rule 5(b)(5) of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine the date a party re-
ceived actual notice of an adverse judgment constitutes an abuse of dis-







222. Id. at 808.
223. Id.
224. 878 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
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cretion, for which mandamus will lie. 225 In Cantu the trial court rendered
judgment against the relator but waited more than a month before send-
ing notice of the judgment to parties in the case. Thirty days after the
date the relator claimed to receive notice, she filed a motion for new trial
and a Rule 5(b)(5) motion for findings as to the date she received notice
of the judgment. The trial court never set a hearing on the Rule 5(b)(5)
motion and the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law.
Thereafter, when the relator attempted to perfect an appeal, the court of
appeals informed her that the appeal would be dismissed for failure to
meet appellate deadlines unless, within ten days, she obtained a trial
court ruling making a sufficient finding under Rule 5(b)(5). The trial
court again refused to hold a Rule 5(b)(5) hearing. The court of appeals
refused mandamus relief. Conditionally granting writ, the Texas Supreme
Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to conduct
the Rule 5(b)(5) hearing to determine the date the relator received actual
notice of the adverse judgment and that the relator had no adequate rem-
edy by appeal because she had no appeal at all without the finding.226
In a similar case, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held in Sharm,
Inc. v. Martinez227 that the trial court abused its discretion by initially
refusing to make a finding of the date on which the appellant received
actual notice of a default judgment, as required by Rule 5 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and, by finding that appellant failed to
prove that it did not have timely notice of the default judgment in the
face of undisputed evidence that it did not.22s
The Houston Court of Appeals, First District, recently construed Rules
5(b)(3) and (4) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to require the
clerk of the trial court to notify the parties or their attorneys immediately
by first-class mail not only of the fact the judgment was signed but also of
the date the judgment was signed.229 In Winkins v. Frank Winther Invest-
ments, Inc.,230 the appellants appealed a summary judgment signed on
March 3, 1992. The judgment did not become final until September 18,
1992, when the trial court signed an order nonsuiting the appellees' coun-
terclaims. The appellants did not file a motion for new trial and, there-
fore, had until October 18, 1992 to perfect their appeal. The appellants
filed their appeal bond on November 5, 1992. On November 13, 1992, the
appellants filed a Rule 306a motion to extend the effective date of the
judgment, alleging they did not find out until November 10 that the final
judgment had been signed on September 18. The appellants had tele-
phoned the clerk of the court between October 6 and 8 to determine if
the order of nonsuit had been signed, and the clerk erroneously told the
225. Id. at 132.
226. Id. at 132.
227. 885 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (per curiam).
228. Id.
229. Winkins v. Frank Winther Invs., Inc., 881 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
230. 881 S.W.2d at 557.
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appellants that the nonsuit had been signed on October 6, rather than
September 18.
The appellants argued in the trial court that, because they did not re-
ceive notice of the date the final judgment was signed within twenty days
after the judgment, they were entitled to the enlargement of time under
Appellate Rule 5(b)(4) to file their appeal bond. The appellees argued
that the rules do not require the clerk to give notice of the date the judg-
ment was signed but only the fact of the signing of the judgment. The
trial court granted the appellants' motion to extend the effective date of
the judgment and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that notice of the
date of the judgment is signed is required under the rules. 231
D. MEETING THE COSTS OF PERFECTING AN APPEAL
Under the Houston Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District's holding in
Click v. Tyra,232 once an appellant perfects appeal by filing the appeal
bond or cash deposit in lieu thereof, a district clerk cannot require cash
payment of the costs before preparing the transcript for appeal.233 An
appeal bond perfects the appeal. Once filed, the bond is sufficient secur-
ity for the costs of preparing the transcript, therefore, and the district
clerk must do so.234
An appeal bond that is double the amount of judgment but does not
cover "costs" is insufficient to perfect an appeal to county court from
justice court.235 The appellant in Almahrabi v. Booe236 attempted to ap-
peal from a $5000 default judgment entered against him in the justice
court. The judgment also included $40 in costs. In an attempt to perfect
his appeal from the justice court to the county court at law, the appellant
filed a $10,000 appeal bond. A few days later, he was notified by the
county clerk's office that he needed to pay the costs of the appeal ($110)
to the county clerk's office within twenty days from the date of the notice
or his appeal would be deemed unperfected under Rule 143a of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellant did not tender the $110 until
thirty-nine days after he received the notice concerning the costs. The
trial court found that the payment of costs under Rule 143a was a juris-
dictional prerequisite and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.237
The court of appeals noted that under the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, in order to perfect an appeal to the county or district court from a
justice court, an appellant must: (1) file an appeal bond (in double the
231. Id. at 558. But see St. Louis Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Summerhouse Joint Ven-
ture, 739 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ) (construing TEx. R.
App. P. 5(b)(4) to require only notice of the fact that the judgment was signed, rather than
notice of the date the signed was signed).
232. 867 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
233. Id. at 407.
234. Id. See TEx. R. App. P. 51(c).
235. Almahrabi v. Booe, 868 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 9.
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amount of the judgment) pursuant to Rule 571 or file an affidavit of in-
ability to pay under Rule 572; and (2) pay to the county clerk, within
twenty days after being notified to do so, the costs of appeal pursuant to
Rule 143a.238 Compliance with these rules is jurisdictional.239 The appel-
lant argued that the $10,000 appeal bond is analogous to a supersedeas
bond and sufficient to satisfy both Rules 571 and 143a. The court of ap-
peals disagreed, stating that while a supersedeas bond may serve as a cost
bond if it is sufficient to secure the costs, the $10,000 bond filed by appel-
lant was only double the amount of the judgment. While this amount
satisfies Rule 571, the court concluded, it is insufficient to cover the costs
of appeal as required by Rule 143a. According to the court, "Appellant is
$110 short. '240
In Laird v. King,241 an appeal from a $5 million judgment for the plain-
tiff in a personal injury lawsuit, the appellant moved for reduction or
elimination of the supersedeas bond securing the judgment. The trial
court reduced the bond amount to $1 million. In a mandamus proceeding
challenging the bond reduction, the appellant argued that Rule
47(b)(1)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes a trial
court to reduce the amount of the supersedeas bond upon a showing that
the reduction would cause no substantial harm to the judgment creditor.
The plaintiffs/relators argued that section 52.002 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code, which explicitly prohibits the reduction of the
supersedeas bond in personal injury cases, governs the issue and super-
sedes Rule 47(b).
Acknowledging that Rule 47(b) appears to permit a lower supersedeas
bond in personal injury cases, the court of appeals held that the plain
language of section 52.002 prohibited the reduction and that Rule 47(b)
therefore does not apply.242 Section 52.005 explicitly states: "To the ex-
tent this chapter conflicts with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
this chapter controls. ''243 Conditionally granting writ, the court con-
cluded that the plain language of section 52.002 does not allow a trial
court to set security in an amount less than the amount of the judgment in
a personal injury case.2 "
According to the Austin Court of Appeals, Rule 46 of the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure permits the trial court to increase the amount of
an appellant's cost bond to cover accrued trial court costs, the cost of the
statement of facts, and the cost of the transcript even if the court in-
creases the bond from the statutory $1000 to $30,000.245 The court in
238. Id. at 10.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 866 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
242. Id. at 113-14.
243. Id at 113.
244. Id.




Maniccia v. Johnson & Gibbs, P.C., specifically pointed out that, under
Rule 46(c), the trial court may, on its own motion, "increase or decrease
the amount of the bond or deposit required .... -246 The purpose of the
appeal bond required by Rule 46, the court held, "is to ensure payment of
all the costs of appeal, including (1) accrued costs of court not previously
paid by the appellant, (2) the fee of the court reporter for preparing the
statement of facts; and (3) the fee of the trial court clerk for preparing the
transcript.' '247 In Maniccia trial court costs totalled $22,000 and the court
reporter estimated the statement of facts would cost $8000. The court of
appeals therefore held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
increasing the amount of the bond and dismissed the appeal pursuant to
Rule 46(c) because the appellants had not filed the required cost bond.248
In Cortez v. Longoria249 the appellants filed an affidavit of inability to
pay cost bond and the appellees filed a motion contesting the affidavit.
The trial court failed to rule on the motion contesting the affidavit within
ten days after it was filed. However, the trial court granted appellees'
motion for extension of time to contest the affidavit of inability twenty-
nine days after the appellants filed their affidavit of inability to pay. The
trial court also granted appellees' contest on the same day.
Conditionally granting writ, the court of appeals noted that under Rule
40(a)(3)(E) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, if a contest to an affi-
davit is filed, the court is required to hear it within ten days after filing
unless the court extends the time for hearing and determining the contest
by a signed written order made within the ten day period and, if no ruling
is made on the contest within the ten days (or within the period of time as
extended by the court), the allegations of the affidavit "shall be taken as
true. '250 Since the trial court made no ruling (on the contest itself or on a
motion for extension of time) within the ten days after the appellees filed
their motion contesting the affidavit, the contest was overruled by opera-
tion of law. Under Rule 40, the allegations in the appellants' affidavit of
inability, therefore, should have been taken as true. 251
VIII. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
A. FILING THE ELECTRONIC RECORD
Under the special rules adopted by the Texas Supreme Court for mak-
ing a record of court proceedings by electronic recording, the court re-
porter is required to file the statement of facts with the court of appeals
within fifteen days of the perfection of an appeal or writ of error.252 Rule
246. Id.
247. Id. at 401.
248. Id. at 402. The court noted that the ability to pay was not an issue before the court
on appeal. Id. at 400.
249. 875 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (orig. proceeding).
250. Id. at 338.
251. Id.
252. National Union v. Ninth Court of Appeals, 864 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex. 1993) (orig.
proceeding).
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54 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that an appellant
may be granted an extension of time for late filing in the court of appeals
of a transcript or statement of facts, if a motion "reasonably explaining"
the need for the extension is filed by the appellant no later than fifteen
days after the last date for filing the record.253 Rule 4 of the special elec-
tronic recording rules provides that "[n]o other filing deadlines as set out
in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure are changed. '254 As a result,
Rule 54(c) and other deadlines in the Texas Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure not inconsistent with deadlines in the special electronic recording
rules are applicable.255
In National Union v. Ninth Court of Appeals, the appellant perfected
its appeal from an electronically recorded proceeding on September 15,
1992. Its statement of facts, therefore, was due on September 30, 1992.
The appellant missed the filing deadline but filed a motion for extension
under Rule 54(c) within the fifteen days' grace period allowed for such
motions. Although the court of appeals initially granted the motion, it
withdrew its order extending the deadline after the appellee argued that
the appellant's motion did not "reasonably explain" the reason for delay.
As a result, the appellant had no timely filed statement of facts upon
which to base its appeal.
With respect to the appellant's mandamus proceeding, the Texas
Supreme Court noted that Rule 54(c) is discretionary and that a court of
appeals does not abuse its discretion by merely refusing to grant a motion
for extension of time even in the presence of a reasonable explanation.
However, it held that the court of appeals in National Union abused its
discretion by basing its decision on an erroneous legal standard for judg-
ing the reasonableness of the movant's explanation.256 A "reasonable ex-
planation" means "any plausible statement of circumstances indicating
that failure to file within the required period was not deliberate or inten-
tional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake or mischance." 257 In
fact, the court held, "any conduct short of deliberate or intentional non-
compliance qualifies, even if that conduct can also be characterized as
professional negligence. '258 The court accepted appellant's "reasonable
explanation" in National Union that it was confused about almost every
element of the proper procedures that must be followed in counties au-
thorized to make records of court proceedings by electronic recording.259
Significantly, the court pointed out that had the court of appeals simply
253. TEx. R. App. P. 54(c).
254. National Union, 864 S.W.2d at 59 n.2.
255. Id
256. Id. at 59. See also Marino v. Hartsfield, 868 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam)
(where circumstances of case were, in all material respects, identical to those in National
Union, and for the reasons given in National Union, supreme court reversed judgment of
court of appeals and remanded the case to that court for filing of the statement of facts and
consideration of all points of error not previously addressed).





refused to grant the extension on discretionary grounds, instead of on the
basis that no reasonable explanation had been stated, the court of appeals
would not have abused its discretion.260 Conditionally granting a writ of
mandamus, the supreme court concluded that the appellant had no ade-
quate remedy by appeal because, absent mandamus, the appellant's relief
would consist of proceeding through an appeal that, without a statement
of facts, "amounts to a useless exercise."'261
Despite its conclusion in National Union that only the filing deadlines
set forth in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure are effectively "pre-
empted" by inconsistent deadlines set forth in the special electronic
rules,262 the Texas Supreme Court held in Uptmore v. Fourth Court of
Appeals that the court of appeals abused its discretion in refusing to ac-
cept and consider a statement of facts that was timely filed under Rule 54
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, even though it was untimely filed
under the rules governing electronically recorded trials. 263 The appellant
in Uptmore did not file a copy of the recording with the court of appeals
within fifteen days of perfecting his appeal, nor did he file a timely mo-
tion for extension. He did, however, file the statement of facts as defined
by Rule 3 of the rules governing electronically recorded trials, as well as a
transcript of the recording, within the time allowed for filing the appellate
record under Rule 54 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Conditionally
granting writ, the Texas Supreme Court held that the court of appeals
abused its discretion in concluding that it was without authority to accept
and consider the statement of facts and that the appellant had no ade-
quate remedy by appeal. 264
B. LOST OR DESTROYED NOTES OR RECORDS
In preparing for a second appeal, the appellant in Piotrowski v.
Minns265 sent a written request to the court reporter to prepare a state-
ment of facts from two ancillary pretrial hearings that took place nine
years prior to his second appeal. The court reporter informed the appel-
lant that the notes for the two hearings were no longer available as she
destroyed the records after three years. Pursuant to Rule 50(e) of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals reversed and
260. Id. at 60 n.4.
261. Id. at 61. Chief Justice Phillips dissented on this point, stating that the appellant
clearly had an adequate remedy by appeal. National Union, 864 S.W.2d at 62. Specifically,
Justice Phillips stated that, assuming the appellant did not ultimately prevail in the court of
appeals, it could challenge that court's refusal to extend the time for filing the statement of
facts by application for writ of error. Id. "How, then" Justice Phillips asked, "could the
court of appeals' ruling inflict irreparable harm justifying expedited review by manda-
mus?" Id. Throughout his dissent, Justice Phillips expressed alarm at the growing number
of mandamus actions passed upon by the supreme court, despite its decision in Walker v.
Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992). In his words, "[t]oday's decision, far from being an
extension of Walker, stands that principle on its head." Id. at 63.
262. National Union, 864 S.W.2d at 59 n.2 (emphasis added).
263. 878 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
264. Id.
265. 873 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1993).
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remanded the case for a new trial. 266 The Texas Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the court of appeals.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to satisfy Rule
50(e), which provides "[i]f the appellant has made a timely request for a
statement of facts, but the court reporter's notes and records have been
lost or destroyed without appellant's fault, the appellant is entitled to a
new trial unless the parties agree on a statement of facts. ' 267 The Texas
Government Code requires court reporters, upon request, to "preserve
the notes for future reference for three years from the date on which they
were taken .... -268 Thus, by negative implication, the court reporter is
authorized to destroy notes after three years when no party has requested
that they be preserved.269 To obtain the benefit of Rule 50(e), an appel-
lant must ensure that notes are not destroyed. The duty to protect the
record, the court held, does not begin at the conclusion of trial, when the
appellant takes the steps to perfect an appeal, but exists at every stage of
the proceedings in the trial court.270 Litigants must exercise "some dili-
gence to ensure that a record of any error will be available in the event
that an appeal will be necessary."'271 The court concluded that the appel-
lant in Minns was at fault for waiting to request preparation of the appel-
late record until it was time for him to appeal.272 According to the court,
he should have acted much earlier, even though he did not know that he
would suffer an adverse judgment and find it necessary to appeal. 273
Justices Hecht, Cornyn and Enoch dissented in Minns, emphasizing the
burden imposed by effectively requiring litigants to have every hearing
transcribed as litigation proceeds, even though no rule of procedure justi-
fies this burden.274
C. LOST EXHIBITS
In Hackney v. First State Bank of Honey Grove275 the original trial ex-
hibits were lost and could not be made a part of the appellate record.
The trial court held a hearing and found that the exhibits could be re-
placed and ordered that the replacement exhibits be made a part of the
appellate record. The appellant objected, arguing that, pursuant to Rule
50(e) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, it was entitled to a new
trial because it did not agree to the substituted exhibits.276 The appellant
relied on the Waco Court of Appeals' holding in Hidalgo, Chambers &
266. Id. at 369.
267. Id at 370.
268. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.046(a)(4) (Vernon 1988).
269. Minns, 873 S.W.2d at 371.
270. Id. at 370.
271. Id
272. Id.
273. Id. at 371.
274. I& at 372-73.




Co. v. FDIC277 to support its contention that it was entitled to a new trial
regardless of whether it had any reasonable basis or justification for not
agreeing to the substituted documents. 278 The Texarkana court rejected
the appellant's contention and, relying on the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals' reasoning in First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez,279 held that if
lost exhibits can be replaced with identical or substantially similar docu-
ments, a party's refusal to agree to the replacements does not require a
new trial under Rule 50(e). 280
The Houston Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, goes even farther.
If the lost exhibits cannot be replaced with identical or substantially simi-
lar documents, the aggrieved party is entitled to a new trial under Rule
50(e) only if it can show that the portion of the record lost would have
changed the outcome on appeal. 281 Otherwise, a remand would waste
judicial resources. 82
D. LATE-FILED STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Office of Public Utility Counsel v. Public Utility Commission of
Texas,283 the appellant timely filed its transcript, but not its statement of
facts, with the court of appeals. Rule 54(a) of the Texas Rules of Appel-
late Procedure precluded the court of appeals from considering the late-
filed statement of facts. The court of appeals therefore affirmed the trial
court's judgment on the sole ground that the appellant did not timely file
its statement of facts.284 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, holding that an appellant's failure to timely file the statement of
facts does not automatically require affirmance of the lower court's judg-
ment as a matter of course.285 The record on appeal, the court noted,
consists of "a transcript and, where necessary to the appeal, a statement of
facts. '' 28 Under Rule 90(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the court of appeals must "address every issue raised and necessary to
final disposition of the appeal," and resolution of some issues does not
necessarily require a statement of facts.287 While a court of appeals can-
not generally conduct a sufficiency of the evidence review absent a state-
ment of facts, the court can address issues, such as those involving legal
error, the determination of which would not require a statement of
facts.288 The Texas Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in
277. 790 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990, writ denied).
278. Hackney, 866 S.W.2d at 61.
279. 852 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
280. Hackney, 866 S.W.2d at 61.
281. Richards v. Suckle, 871 S.W.2d 239,243 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no
writ).
282. I&
283. 878 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
284. d. at 599.
285. Id. at 599.
286. Id. (citing TEx. R. App. P. 50(a) (emphasis added)).
287. Id. at 599-600.
288. Id. at 600.
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affirming the judgment without considering the legal issues raised by the
appellant. 289
E. SUA SPONTE EXTENSION OF TIME
In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Management, Inc.,290 the
court reporter did not complete the statement of facts for more than a
year after it was originally due, and the appellant filed nine timely mo-
tions to extend the due date, none of which the appellee opposed and all
of which the court of appeals granted. The deadline set by the court of
appeals in response to the appellant's last motion was December 2, 1991.
On its own motion, but before the December 2 deadline, the court of
appeals postponed the December 2 deadline for filing the statement of
facts until December 18. The petitioner argued to the Texas Supreme
Court that the December 2 deadline could only be extended on the mo-
tion of a party, not on the court's own motion. The court rejected this
contention.
The Texas Supreme Court noted that while a court cannot grant an
untimely motion to extend the time for filing the appellate record and
cannot accept the record after the time for filing it and the time for filing
a motion for extension have both expired, 291 the court has discretion to
set a new deadline after it grants a timely filed motion for extension.292
The court reasoned that it would not make sense to allow the court dis-
cretion in setting the deadline, but not in adjusting it after it was set and
before it expired. 293 The court specifically declined to address whether a
court of appeals may extend a filing deadline in the complete absence of a
timely motion to extend or whether a court can grant an extension, with-
out a motion, after a previously extended deadline has expired. 294
F. BURDEN OF PRESENTING COMPLETE RECORD TO COURT OF
APPEALS
The appellant bears the burden of filing a complete record to support
its points of error. In Fiesta Mart, Inc. v. Hall295 the trial court assessed
the defendant/convenience store guardian ad litem fees even though the
store prevailed on the plaintiffs' claims. The store appealed the ruling but
failed to include in the record on appeal a statement of facts of the hear-
ing at which the trial court orally assessed the fees. The record on appeal
included only the transcript and statement of facts from the trial on
liability.
289. Id.
290. 877 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1994).
291. Id. at 278 (citing Chojnacki v. First Court of Appeals, 699 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1985)
and Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977)).
292. Texas Instruments, 877 S.W.2d at 278.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 278 n.2.
295. 886 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
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To obtain a reversal, an appellant must present the appellate court with
a record that shows the error about which the appellant complains. 296
Without a statement of facts from the good cause hearing, the court of
appeals found that it could not determine if the trial court made the nec-
essary oral findings to satisfy Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 141's require-
ments for assessing CoStS.2 9 7 Affirming the trial court's award, the court
of appeals concluded that it was required to presume the trial court made
all necessary findings to support its assessment of costs. 298
Despite Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 50(d)'s mandate that the
burden is on the appellant to see that a sufficient record is presented to
show error requiring reversal, an omission from the record that amounts
only to a "defect of appellate procedure" under Rule 83 of the appellate
procedure rules may be corrected by the filing of a supplemental tran-
script after submission. In Crais v. Haynes,299 the appellant failed to re-
quest for inclusion in the transcript the court's charge, the jury verdict,
and the judgment rendered on the verdict. After submission, the Waco
Court of Appeals determined that it could not review the trial court's
judgment without these documents. 300 Acknowledging that under Rule
50(d) the appellant has the burden to see that a sufficient record is
presented to show error requiring reversal, the court of appeals nonethe-
less found that the omission of the charge, verdict and judgment from the
transcript was merely a "defect of appellate procedure" under Rule 83.301
Rule 83 states that "[a] judgment shall not be affirmed or reversed or an
appeal dismissed for defects or irregularities, in appellate procedure,
either of form or substance, without allowing a reasonable time to correct
or amend such defects or irregularities .... -302 The court ordered the
clerk to prepare and forward the missing documents to it by way of sup-
plemental transcript, after which the case would be resubmitted for re-
view without oral argument. 30 3
296. Id. at 42.
297. It at 443. Rule 141 provides: "The court may assess costs against any party to the
litigation upon a showing of good cause." TEX. R. Civ. P. 141.
298. Fiesta Mart, 886 S.W.2d at 443. See DeSai v. Islas, 884 S.W.2d 204, 205-06 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1994, writ denied) (appellant has duty to bring forth a sufficient appellate
record and without one, the court of appeals must presume that the trial court heard suffi-
cient evidence to support its decision and properly stated reasons for finding good cause
and taxing guardian ad litem fees against appellant).
299. 867 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, no writ) (per curiam).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. TEX. R. App. P. 50(d), 83.
303. Crais, 867 S.W.2d at 413.
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IX. THE LIMITED APPEAL
A. SEVERABILITY
Under Rule 40(a)(4), a limited appeal may only be taken from a "sev-
erable portion" of the judgment.30 4 In its opinion in Oliver v. Oliver,305
the Texas Supreme Court held that "severability" in the context of a lim-
ited appeal is not analogous to severability in the context of a compulsory
counterclaim.30 6 Claims may be severable under Rule 40(a)(4) even if
they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. 30 7 In Oliver the
appellant/defendant asserted a compulsory counterclaim that would have
been time-barred unless section 16.069 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code applied to extend the statute of limitations for a claim
"arising out of the same transaction or occurrence" that was the basis of
the appellee/plaintiff 's lawsuit.308 The trial court rendered a take-nothing
judgment on the appellant's counterclaim, holding that section 16.069 did
not apply, and the claim was time-barred. 30 9 The appellant filed a limited
appeal under Rule 40(a)(4), arguing that section 16.069 permitted her
counterclaim, but the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
In the Texas Supreme Court, the appellee argued that the appellant
was estopped from relying upon section 16.069 to extend the statute of
limitations because, in limiting her appeal, she designated her counter-
claim as "severable" from the remainder of the trial court's judgment and
thus, according to appellee, it did not arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence as plaintiff's claims. The appellee argued that if the appel-
lant's counterclaim were compulsory, it would not be "severable" for pur-
poses of pursuing a limited appeal. Reversing the judgment of the court
of appeals, the supreme court held that the rationale proposed by the
appellee does not extend to limitation of appeals, "as all challenges to a
trial court's judgment are addressed together on appeal regardless of
whether the appellant initially limits the appeal under Rule 40(a)(4).1310
Claims may be severable, therefore, under Rule 40(a)(4) even though
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. 311
B. FILING A LIMITED RECORD IN A LIMITED APPEAL
Although Rule 53(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure per-
mits the filing of a limited record on appeal, a party wishing to limit the
record must comply with the strict requirements of this rule. For exam-
ple, in Matthews v. Land Tool Co.,312 the appellants attempted to limit
304. TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(4).
305. 889 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. 1994).
306. Id. at 273.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 272.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 273.
311. Id.
312. 868 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
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their appeal to review of the trial court's grant of the appellee's motion
for directed verdict on its Deceptive Trade Practices Act cause of action.
The appellants submitted only a limited statement of facts, which in-
cluded primarily one witness' testimony and opening argument. Under
Rule 53(d), however, the party who requests a limited statement of facts
must also submit, either with the request or in an attached document, a
statement of the points of error on which the party intends to rely. 313 The
appellants did not file a statement of their points of error.
The court of appeals noted that when a party makes a proper request
for a limited statement of facts, the requesting party receives a significant
benefit from the presumption on appeal that nothing omitted from the
record is relevant to any of the points specified or to the disposition of
the appeal.314 On the other hand, the court pointed out, the failure to
comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 53(d) leads to "dire
consequences" because the court of appeals must presume that the miss-
ing parts are relevant. 315 Affirming the trial court's judgment, the court
of appeals concluded that, because the appellants failed to comply with
the requirements of Rule 53(d), the court of appeals had to presume that
the omitted evidence supported the trial court's judgment. 31 6
X. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
An appellate court cannot affirm a summary judgment on grounds not
expressly set forth in the motion or response. In Stiles v. Resolution Trust
Corp.,317 involving a suit on a note, the RTC, as receiver for the plaintiff/
bank, filed a motion for summary judgment but did not mention in its
motion the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine or 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e). 318
The trial court rendered summary judgment for the RTC without specify-
ing the grounds for its ruling. 319 The court of appeals affirmed because
the evidence produced by the nonmovant did not satisfy the requirements
of D'Oench and section 1823(e). 320 The court concluded that, even
though the RTC had not raised D'Oench or section 1823(e) in the trial
court, the nonmovant had the burden to negate the doctrine to raise a
fact issue regarding his affirmative defenses. 32'
Reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, the Texas Supreme
Court held that, although not expressly precluded by the language of
313. Id. at 26 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 53(d)).
314. Id. at 27.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 867 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. 1993).
318. Id. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine originated in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). It prevents an obligor from asserting as a defense an oral side
agreement with the obligee in an action to collect on a note.
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Rule 166a(c), an appellate court cannot affirm a summary judgment on
grounds not expressly stated in the motion or response. 322 The court rea-
soned that the assertion of a new ground before the appellate court in
support of summary judgment could prejudice the nonmovant's ability to
demonstrate that the new issue raises a genuine issue of material fact.323
Further, "in all cases it deprives the litigants and the appellate court of
the benefit of the trial court's judgment on the issue. '324
B. REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT'S VENUE DETERMINATIONS
Under the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc.,325
an appellate court reviewing a trial court's ruling on venue must conduct
an independent review of the entire record to determine whether venue
was proper in the ultimate county of suit.3 26 The Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code governs the standard for appellate review of a denial of a
motion to transfer venue: "On appeal from the trial on the merits, if
venue was improper it shall in no event be harmless error. In determin-
ing whether venue was or was not proper, the appellate court shall con-
sider the entire record, including the trial on the merits." 327 The court in
Ruiz observed that the procedure mandated by this statute is "fundamen-
tally flawed because it allows appellate review of venue on a basis differ-
ent from that on which it was decided. ' 328 In deciding a motion to
transfer venue, the court determined, the trial court is required by Rule
87 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to take as true those facts of
which prima facie proof is made by the party with the burden of such
proof; "yet in reviewing the trial court's decision, an appellate court must
reverse (there cannot be harmless error) if other evidence in the record,
even evidence adduced after venue was determined, destroys the prima
facie proof on which the trial court relied." 329 Despite the dubious wis-
dom of the statute, the court held that there is "no misunderstanding its
plain language: an appellate court is obliged to conduct an independent
review of the entire record to determine whether venue was proper in the
ultimate county of suit."'330
If there is any probative evidence in the entire record (including trial
on the merits) to support the trial court's determination, even if the pre-
ponderance of the evidence is to the contrary, the appellate court must
uphold the trial court's venue determination.331 If there is no such evi-
dence, but there is probative evidence that venue was proper in the
county to which transfer was sought, the appellate court should instruct
322. Id.
323. 867 S.W.2d at 26.
324. Id
325. 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993).
326. Id at 758.
327. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986).
328. 868 S.W.2d at 757.
329. Id.




the trial court to transfer the case to that county. 332 Only if there is no
probative evidence that venue was proper either in the county of suit or
in the county to which transfer was sought should the appellate court
remand the case to the trial court to conduct further proceedings on the
issue of venue.333
C. FAcTUAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW - GENERALLY
In Jaffe Aircraft Corp. v. Carr,334 a negligence action relating to an air-
plane crash, the jury answered "No" to the question "Did the negligence
of [the defendant] proximately cause the occurrence in question?" 335
Based on this finding, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment
against the plaintiffs. The court of appeals, however, reversed the trial
court's judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial on the ground
that the jury's failure to answer "Yes" to this question "was so against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be wrong and un-
just. ' 336 While the court of appeals detailed the evidence supporting a
"Yes" answer, it failed to discuss the evidence in the record supporting
the jury's negative finding.337 Rather, the court's opinion contained only
a single reference to evidence supporting the verdict.338 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment on the basis that
it applied the incorrect legal standard in its review of the evidence. 339
The court repeated the requirements first set out in Pool v. Ford Motor
Co. 340 and held that these requirements apply to the review of both af-
firmative and negative jury findings. 341 A court of appeals must "detail
the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and clearly state why
the jury's finding is factually insufficient or is so against the great weight
and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust; why it shocks the con-
science; or clearly demonstrates bias. ' '342 The court of appeals should
further, in its opinion, "state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly
outweighs the evidence in support of the verdict. '343
In Ellis County State Bank v. Keever,3" decided after Jaffe, the Texas
Supreme Court held that although it requires that every appellate opin-
ion involving a reversal of a trial court judgment on factual insufficiency
grounds to detail the evidence as described in Pool and Jaffe, this require-
ment does not extend to cases in which the court of appeals upholds the
332. 868 S.W.2d at 758.
333. Id.
334. 867 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1993).
335. Id. at 28.
336. Id.
337. Id at 29.
338. 867 S.W.2d at 29 n.2.
339. Id. at 29.
340. 715 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. 1986).
341. 867 S.W.2d at 29.
342. Id. at 28 (quoting Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 634).
343. Jaffe, 867 S.W. 2d at 28 (quoting Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 634).
344. 888 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1994).
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trial court judgment. 345 The court reasoned that the purpose for requir-
ing the appellate court to detail the evidence supporting reversal is to
discourage a court of appeals from merely substituting its judgment for
that of the jury.346 Requiring the detailing of all evidence supporting a
judgment, the court concluded, imposes a burden on the court of appeals
not consistent with this purpose.347
D. No EVIDENCE REVIEW - GENERALLY
In Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna,348 the Texas Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its limited role in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support
a jury verdict. The court reviews only the evidence in support of the find-
ing to determine whether there is some evidence that provides a legal
basis for the finding.349 If more than a scintilla of evidence exists, the
claim is sufficient as a matter of law.350 While the Texas Supreme Court
cannot convert some evidence into no evidence, it also cannot "convert
mere suspicion or surmise into some evidence."'351 In Reyna, the court
reversed and rendered judgment for Browning-Ferris, Inc. because "some
suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which
is not the same as some evidence. '352
E. REVIEW OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SPECIFIC CLAIMS
1. No Evidence Review of Finding of Bad Faith
In Lyons v. Millers Casualty Ins. Co.,353 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed legal sufficiency review of fact findings of bad faith against an
insurer. The court noted that appellate review in a bad faith case
presents unusual problems, primarily because the reviewing court must
determine whether there is "no evidence" of a negative fact-that the
insurer had no reasonable basis to deny or delay payment of a claim.354
To aid the appellate court in its no evidence review, the supreme court
articulated what it characterized as "nothing more than a particularized
application of our traditional no evidence review. '' 355 The appellate court
must focus on the relationship of the evidence arguably supporting the
bad faith finding to the elements of bad faith.356 The evidence must re-
late to the tort issue of "no reasonable basis" not just to the contract issue
345. Id. at 794. This rule does not apply to the review of punitive damages awards. See
notes 372-75 and accompanying text.
346. Id. (quoting Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635).
347. Keever, 888 S.W.2d at 794.
348. 865 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1993).
349. Id. at 927-28.
350. 1& at 928.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 927.
353. 866 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1993).





of coverage. 357 Justice Doggett in dissent concluded that the court's pro-
nouncement to focus on the relationship of the evidence to the elements
of bad faith inartfully camouflaged its attempt in bad faith cases to turn a
legal sufficiency review into a factual sufficiency review.358
In Lyons, the petitioner's insurance carrier denied her claim under a
homeowner's policy for damage to the house. The petitioner claimed that
the damage to her house was caused by a windstorm, a covered peril,
while the carrier claimed the damage was caused by the settling of the
foundation, an excluded peril. The petitioner sued the carrier, alleging
among other claims, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. At
trial, the carrier presented evidence that it had engaged the services of a
professional engineer specializing in damage and failure analysis to in-
spect the property and that it had relied on this expert's report in denying
the petitioner's claim. Nonetheless, the jury found (among other find-
ings) that the carrier breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in
failing to pay the petitioner's claim.359 The trial court rendered judgment
on the verdict but the court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-
nothing judgment on the petitioner's bad faith claim, holding that there
was no evidence of the breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.36°
Outlining the standards for appellate review of the legal sufficiency of
evidence in bad faith cases, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court
of appeals' finding of no evidence of no reasonable basis.361 The supreme
court pointed out that the evidence the petitioner offered in support of
the bad faith finding consisted of an expert's opinion that the windstorm
caused the damages and the testimony of the petitioner and her neigh-
bors that the brick veneer on the house was visibly damaged after the
storm.362 This evidence, the court held, supported only the jury's finding
that the petitioner's damage was caused in part by the wind and thus
covered by the policy. 363 This evidence, therefore, showed only that the
carrier was mistaken as to its contract liability. The evidence, however,
did not show that the carrier's denial of the claim was unreasonable. To
support a bad faith claim, the petitioner had to offer evidence that the
reports of the carrier's experts were not objectively prepared, that the
carrier's reliance on them was unreasonable, or that other evidence ex-
isted from which a factfinder could infer that the carrier acted without a
reasonable basis, and that it knew or should have know that it lacked a
reasonable basis for its actions.364 The court thus emphasized that the
evidence "must relate to the tort issue of no reasonable basis for denial or
delay in payment of a claim, not just to the contract issue of coverage. '365
357. Id
358. 866 S.W.2d at 602.
359. Id. at 599.
360. Id.
361. d. at 601.
362. 866 S.W.2d at 600-01.
363. Id. at 601.
364. Id
365. Id. at 600.
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2. No Evidence Review of Gross Negligence Findings
In Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel,366 the Texas Supreme Court con-
sidered what constitutes legally sufficient evidence of gross negligence to
support an award of punitive damages in a bad faith case. Claims for
punitive damages in bad faith cases present the problem of distinguishing
between simple bad faith and bad faith accompanied by aggravated con-
duct such as gross negligence. 367 In a "substantial clarification," the court
held that gross negligence includes two elements, one objective and one
subjective: "(1) viewed objectively from the standpoint of the actor, the
act or omission must involve an extreme degree of risk, considering the
probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others, and (2) the
actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nev-
ertheless proceed in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare
of others. '368 The court made clear that gross negligence in a bad faith
case is identical to gross negligence in other cases.369 It concluded that
the evidence did not support either (1) the inference that the defendant
had any subjective awareness that the plaintiff would probably suffer seri-
ous injury, or (2) the inference that the defendant's actions created any
risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.370 The court emphasized that the
defendant could not be liable for punitive damages under a gross negli-
gence theory unless it was "actually aware of an extreme risk-some gen-
uine and unjustifiable likelihood of serious harm to [the plaintiff] that was
independent and qualitatively different from the inconvenience" of a
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.371
3. Review of Evidence of Punitive Damages
The Texas Supreme Court in Moriel further held that the court of ap-
peals, whether affirming or reversing the trial court, must detail the rele-
vant evidence and explain why the evidence either supports or does not
support a punitive damages award.372 The court noted that under its de-
cision in Pool v. Ford Motor Co. ,373 courts of appeals, when reversing on
insufficiency grounds, should detail the evidence in their opinions and ex-
plain why the jury's finding is factually insufficient or is so against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly un-
just.374 In Moriel, the court held that because a jury has broad discretion
in awarding punitive damages, the same type of review is appropriate
when a court of appeals affirms a punitive damage award. 375
366. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
367. Id. at 18.
368. Id. at 23.
369. Id. at 24.
370. 879 S.W.2d at 26.
371. Id. at 25-26.
372. Id. at 30-31.
373. 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).





As the decisions reviewed reflect, the Texas Supreme Court seems de-
termined to assist practitioners in their bona fide efforts to invoke the
jurisdiction of the appellate courts. Under Springer v. Spruiell,376 a sum-
mary judgment clearly stating it is disposing of all claims and parties is
final for purposes of appeal, regardless whether the summary judgment
motion raised all causes of action. 377 Under Linwood v. NCNB of
Texas,378 Blankenship v. Robins379 and Maxfield v. Terry,380 the courts of
appeals may not dismiss an appeal for want of jurisdiction when the ap-
pellant makes a bona fide attempt to invoke the court's jurisdiction, even
if the appellant simply fails, as in Linwood, to follow the clear mandates
of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The supreme court's clearing
of the appellate jurisdictional path permits the resolution of more appeals
on their merits; the court still warns, however, that appellate points can
be waived through inadequate briefing.381
376. 866 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1993). The supreme court relied upon its reasoning in
Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
377. Id. at 591. Under the Texas Supreme Court's holding in McConnell v. Southside
Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993), all grounds for summary judgment must be
expressly set forth in the movant's motion for summary judgment. Id. The movant may
not recover under any grounds not expressly set forth in the motion. Id. Under the court's
decision in Springer, however, even if the motion for summary judgment does not address
all of the plaintiff's live causes of action, the movant may nonetheless obtain a judgment
"final" for purposes of appeal disposing of all such causes of action if the trial court in-
cludes "Mother Hubbard" language in the summary judgment. 866 S.W.2d at 591-92. See
Springer v. First Nat'l Bank of Plainview, 866 S.W.2d 626, 630-31 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1992), rev'd, Springer v. Spruiell, 866 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1993).
378. 885 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
379. 878 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
380. 888 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1994).
381. Fredonia State Bank v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994).
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